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d  2 
Non-technical Summary 
 
Standards and technical regulations exist to protect consumer safety or to achieve other goals, 
such as ensuring the interoperability of telecommunications systems, for example.  Standards and 
technical regulations can, however, raise substantially both start-up and production costs for 
firms.  We develop econometric models to provide the first estimates of the incremental 
production costs for firms in developing nations in conforming to standards imposed by major 
importing countries.  We use firm-level data generated from 16 developing countries in the 
World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Survey Database.  Our findings indicate that 
standards do increase short-run production costs by requiring additional inputs of labor and 
capital.  A 1 percent increase in investment to meet compliance costs in importing countries 
raises variable production costs by between 0.06 and 0.13 percent, a statistically significant 
increase. We also find that the fixed costs of compliance are non-trivial; approximately $425,000 
per firm, or about 4.7 percent of value added on average. 
 
Our results may be interpreted as one indication of the extent to which standards and technical 
regulations might constitute barriers to trade.  While the relative impact on costs of compliance 
are relatively small, these costs can be decisive factors driving export success for companies.  In 
this context, there is scope for considering that the costs associated with more limited exports to 
countries with import regulations may not conform to World Trade Organization rules 
encouraging harmonization of regulations to international standards, for example.  Policy 
solutions then might be sought by identifying the extent to which subsidies or public support 
programs are needed to offset the cost disadvantage that arises from non-harmonized technical 




   3 
1. Introduction 
 
Technical regulations, such as product certification requirements, performance mandates, 
testing procedures, conformity assessments, and labeling standards, exist to ensure consumer 
safety, network reliability, or other goals.  However, such regulations can significantly raise 
setup and production costs.  As a consequence, they may act as impediments to competition by 
blocking firm entry and expansion within a country or, as is frequently alleged by exporting 
firms, as barriers to trade.
1  Indeed, there has been a rising use of technical regulations as 
instruments of commercial policy in the unilateral, regional, and global trade contexts (Maskus 
and Wilson, 2001).  As traditional barriers to trade have fallen, these non-tariff barriers have 
become of particular concern to firms in developing countries, which may bear relatively larger 
costs in meeting their requirements than their counterparts in developed nations.  
Developing countries are typically “standards takers” rather than “standards makers” 
since, at the national level, developing their own standards tends to be more costly than adopting 
those of the major markets (Stephenson, 1997).  At the firm level, complying with differing 
standards in such major export markets as the European Union (EU), the United States, and 
Japan can add costs and limit export competitiveness. 
These costs associated with foreign standards and technical regulations may be borne 
publicly and privately.  But developing countries typically have neither the public resources 
required to provide national laboratories for testing and certification nor the capability for 
collective action to raise their standards.  As a result, a significant portion of meeting the costs of 
standards may be borne by individual firms. 
                                                 
1 See the case studies in Wilson and Abiola (2003).   4 
Despite the evident importance of this question, to date the impacts of technical standards 
imposed by importing nations on the production costs of firms in developing countries have not 
been studied systematically in an econometric framework.  Quantification of these effects is 
important for several reasons.  First, it is useful to shed light on competing claims about the 
efficiency and cost impacts of foreign standards and regulations, including how these rules affect 
labor and capital usage.  To the extent that costs are increased or input use is distorted the 
prospects for efficient industrial development could be impeded.  Second, the estimates should 
be informative for governments in setting domestic standards by illustrating their potential costs.  
In this context, harmonization with international standards may not be optimal.  Third, a finding 
that costs are raised would support the view that technical regulations may be used to limit 
market access.  In cases where the importing country’s regulations may not conform to WTO 
obligations, the empirical results could help assess the damages to the exporting country’s trade 
benefits.  Thus, information on the cost impacts could facilitate the resolution of trade disputes 
(Maskus and Wilson, 2001).  
In this paper we develop econometric models to estimate the incremental production 
costs of enterprises in several developing nations associated with conforming to standards and 
technical regulations imposed by major importing countries.  We use firm-level data generated 
through the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey Database.  Our sample includes 159 
firms in 12 industries located in 16 developing countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America, the 
Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  We employ transcendental logarithmic cost 
functions to separate impacts of initial compliance cost from variable cost elements in production.  
Our results suggest that the need to comply with foreign technical standards has a significantly   5 
positive impact.  Specifically, the elasticity of (variable) production costs with respect to 
standards and technical regulations is estimated to range between 0.06 and 0.13.  Evaluated at 
sample means, this result implies an increase in variable costs of a dollar magnitude that is 
similar to the rise in initial compliance costs. 
In Section 2 we provide background information regarding central issues of technical 
standards, costs, and trade.  In Section 3 we specify the econometric model for assessing the cost 
effects of meeting foreign standards and technical regulations.  In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss 




In principle, product standards
2 play a variety of useful roles in overcoming market 
failures (Stephenson, 1997).  For example, emission standards oblige firms to internalize the 
costs of maintaining an acceptably low degree of environmental damage.  Food safety standards 
ensure that consumers are protected from health risks and deceptive practices, information about 
which would not ordinarily be available in private markets.  For consumers, efficient and non-
discriminatory standards allow comparison of products on a common basis in terms of regulatory 
characteristics, permitting enhanced competition.   From the producers’ point of view, 
production of goods subject to recognized standards could achieve economies of scale and 
reduce overall costs.  Since standards themselves embody information about technical 
                                                 
2 The terms “standards” and “standards and technical regulations” are used interchangeably throughout this paper.  
The WTO provides a clear distinction between standards and technical regulations; the former are voluntary and the 
latter are mandatory technical requirements.  In many cases “standards” cover mandatory technical requirements.      6 
knowledge, conformity to efficient standards encourages firms to improve the quality and 
reliability of their products. 
Standards also may reduce transaction costs in business by increasing the transparency of 
product information and compatibility of products and components (David and Greenstein, 1990).  
This is possible as technical regulations can increase the flow of information between producers 
and consumers regarding the inherent characteristics and quality of products.  In short, 
consumers can reduce uncertainty in determining product quality due to standardization of 
products (Jones and Hudson, 1996). 
International standards, in the absence of multilateral consensus on the appropriate level 
or setup of standards, also provide common reference points for countries to follow so that 
transaction costs can be reduced.  For example, in 1961 Codex Alimentarius was developed as a 
single international reference point in order to draw attention to the field of food safety and 
quality.  Similarly, international standards developed by the International Standards Organization 
(ISO) provide a basis especially for the developing countries to choose norms that are recognized 
in foreign markets.  In this regard, conformity to global standards can increase export 
opportunities.     
  Despite their potential to expand competition and trade, standards may be set to achieve 
the opposite outcomes.  In general, standards selection could act to raise the compliance costs of 
some firms (e.g., new entrants) relative to other firms (e.g., incumbents) thereby restricting 
competition (Fischer and Serra, 2000).  This outcome may be most likely in the context of 
international trade, where governments might choose technical regulations to favor domestic 
firms over foreign rivals, thereby restricting trade.  This issue could be particularly problematic   7 
for small exporting firms from developing countries, for they would need to absorb the fixed 
costs of meeting multiple international regulations without enjoying domestic scale advantages.   
Because economic theory suggests that technical regulations can either enhance or 
impede trade, it is unsurprising that empirical evidence is mixed.  Some studies support the claim 
of an efficiency-increasing effect.  Swann et al (1996) studied the impacts of standards on British 
exports and imports over the period 1985-1991.  Standards data were constructed as a simple 
count of the number of standards by industry.  Their findings concluded that adherence to British 
national standards tended to raise both imports and exports.  Moenius (1999) found that 
standards shared by two countries had a positive and significant effect on trade volumes in a 
gravity model.  Gasiorek et al (1992) employed a CGE approach to find that harmonization of 
standards in the EU would reduce trade costs by 2.5 percent. 
In contrast, the fact that regulations can act as barriers to trade is evident in three recent 
studies.  Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) estimated the impact of changes in the EU 
standard on maximum aflatoxin levels in food using trade and regulatory survey data for 15 
European countries and nine African countries between 1989 and 1998.  The results suggested 
that implementation of proposed new aflatoxin standards in the EU would reduce African 
exports of cereals, dried fruits, and nuts to Europe by 64% or US$ 670 million.  Wilson and 
Otsuki (2002) studied the impact of pesticide standards on banana trade.  The authors examined 
regulatory data from 11 OECD importing countries and trade data from 19 exporting countries.  
The results indicated that a ten-percent increase in regulatory stringency—tighter restrictions on 
the pesticide chlorpyrifos—would lead to a decrease in banana imports of 14.8 percent.  In 
another paper Wilson, Otsuki and Majumdar (2002) addressed the question of whether cross-  8 
country standards for maximum tetracycline (a widely used antibiotic) affected beef trade.  They 
examined the effects of the tetracycline standard on beef trade between six importing and 16 
exporting countries.  The results suggested that a ten-percent more stringent regulation on 
tetracycline use would cause a decrease in beef imports by 6.2 percent. 
Survey evidence also points to cost-raising characteristics of technical regulations.  A 
survey by the OECD (2000) as well as the interviews conducted by the United States 
International Trade Commission (1998) shed some light on the size of standards-related costs.
3  
According to the OECD study, which was based on 55 firms in three sectors in the United States, 
Japan and the United Kingdom, the additional costs of complying with foreign standards can be 
as high as 10 percent.  The United States International Trade Commission informally interviewed 
representatives of the U.S. information technology industry.  Interview responses revealed that 
standards-related costs are considered the most significant trade barrier in that sector. 
  Overall, therefore, theoretical models and empirical evidence are mixed on the trade 
impacts of foreign standards.  However, the empirical studies undertaken to date adopt indirect, 
and potentially misleading, approaches to understanding the cost impacts of regulatory 
requirements.  Specifically, the econometric investigations estimate reduced-form or gravity 
models of bilateral trade in which standards are entered as a determinant of trade flows.  The 
survey evidence is informative but fails to incorporate the responses directly into a well-specified 
cost function.  Thus, a significant omission in this literature is that none of these studies has 
taken a systematic and parametric approach to estimating the actual cost impacts of complying 
with international standards.   It is of considerable interest to study the extent to which variable 
                                                 
3 See the discussion in Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki (2001).   9 
production costs are raised by these compliance needs and whether such compliance efforts have 
impacts on factor demand within firms.  This is the task to which we turn next.   
 
3. Modeling the Cost Effects of Standards  
A full accounting of the implications of a firm’s decision to comply with standards 
requires close study of both the costs and benefits of doing so.  Our focus here is strictly on the 
supply side and we leave aside the demand for compliance.
4  Thus, our aim is to provide an 
initial quantification of the costs incurred by firms in developing countries as they meet technical 
regulations required in major export markets.  It is of considerable interest to determine whether 
such cost increases are significant. 
3.1 Cost Function 
Consider a firm exporting a product to a foreign market that mandates conformity with 
standard s.  We assume that the firm's compliance with any domestic standard is a sunk cost and 
does not affect its decision to meet the foreign requirement.  In principle the foreign standard 
could affect both the firm's fixed costs (e.g., by requiring product redesign) and its variable costs 
(e.g., by devoting more labor to product certification).  To capture this possibility, we model 
initial investment in compliance with the standard as a quasi-fixed factor and estimate a short-run 
variable cost function.
5  In this view, fixed costs are incurred in investing in compliance while 
                                                 
4 Our data are insufficient for the analysis of demand for compliance. Such an analysis will require data on unit 
prices of products that comply with standards and those that do not in each export market.  This data is not currently 
available. 
5 See Berndt and Hesse (1986), Morrison (1988), and Badulescu (2003) for further discussion.  Badulescu sets out a 
similar specification in which R&D is a quasi-fixed input across countries.   10 
firms alter their capital and labor usage to meet recurring costs.  Thus, our cost estimates reflect 
short-run equilibrium and cannot be considered estimates of full adjustment to the long run.     
In general, then, the cost function for the firm is specified as 
  ) , ; , ( z s y w C C =             (1) 
Here, w refers to a vector of factor prices, y is output, s indicates the stringency of the foreign 
standard, and z is a vector of other variables affecting firm-level costs.  The firm minimizes 
variable costs wx, where x is the vector of variable inputs.  The cost function is assumed to have 
standard properties: non-decreasing in w and y, concave in w, and homogeneous of degree one 
with respect to w. 
This general cost function has the stringency of standards and technical regulations, s, as 
an argument because differential standards and technical regulations should affect the choice of 
inputs for producing a given output level.  That is, firms are informed about the technical 
regulations required to sell their products in foreign markets.  They make input allocation 
decisions between production activities in the traditional sense and efforts that are devoted to 
comply with the standards and technical regulations. 
3.2 Estimation Models 
We estimate firm-level parametric cost functions.  This approach requires three central 
assumptions.  The first is that all firms, across industries and countries, share the same 
technology.  Application of the transcendental logarithmic (translog) function to industry-level 
production data across OECD countries shows that this assumption is unlikely to hold (Harrigan, 
1997).  In the most general case we should estimate firm-level fixed effects and fully flexible 
quadratic terms between these effects and all cost-related variables in order to permit factor   11 
biases in technical differences.  Unfortunately, such a specification would more than exhaust the 
available degrees of freedom and is infeasible.  Thus, we include in vector z industry and country 
fixed effects in every specification to control for differences in technology relative to the 
benchmark function.  Nonetheless, this approach requires making the residual assumptions that 
firms within an industry within each country share the same cost functions and that efficiency 
differences by industry and country are Hicks-neutral. 
A second problem is that estimation of a cost function incorporating intermediate inputs 
requires firm-level data on prices of materials and intermediates, which our survey data do not 
provide.  Accordingly, we specify equation (1) as the cost of producing net output, or value 
added, introducing only labor and capital as variable inputs.  Thus, we assume that the value-
added cost function is weakly separable from the aggregator for raw materials and intermediate 
inputs.  The weak separability of the cost function implies that the choice of relative labor and 
capital inputs will be independent of material and intermediate input prices.
6   
The cost function that reflects this technology is rewritten as 
)) , ; , ( ), , ; , ( ( ) , ; , (
2 2 1 1 z s w y C z s w y C z s y w C = ,         (2) 
where  ) , {
1
K L w w w = and
2 w is the vector of prices for variable inputs other than labor and capital.  
These subcomponents of the overall cost function should be homogeneous of degree one in w
1 
and w
2, respectively, in order to be consistent with the linear homogeneity of C in w.  Thus, this 
cost function allows for each subcomponent to be estimated separately.  Our goal is to estimate 
                                                 
6 In our particular case, the separability condition is written as 
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the elasticity of value-added cost (which corresponds to C
1) with respect to standards.  This 
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The third assumption is that factor prices are exogenous to firms, permitting their input 
choices to be made endogenously.  However, inspection of our survey data shows that direct 
application of this assumption to a cross-section of firms is untenable because firms inevitably 
report different average wage rates (or annual salaries) and returns to capital.  Put differently, 
direct construction of labor and capital prices from the survey data makes use of variables that 
are endogenous, both in principle and in fact. 
Consider, for example, the calculation of average salary per firm, which we define as 
total payroll divided by firm employment.  This computation generates figures for annual wage 
rates that vary across firms within each country, as suggested by the summary data in Table 1.  
Thus, the notion that firms inside a country, or even within an industry, face a common wage in a 
competitive labor market is questionable.  Similarly, we calculate an average capital price per 
firm as operating surplus (value added less payroll), divided by the value of fixed assets.  As may 
be seen in Table 1, these constructed prices vary across firms as well.   
One approach to resolving this difficulty would be to apply a national-average (or 
industry-average) salary and price of capital to all firms.  Such aggregate prices could be justified 
as exogenous to each enterprise.  However, to do so would sacrifice the cross-sectional variation 
in factor prices needed to identify the cost function.  To cope with this problem we employ an 
instrumental variables technique in which we recognize that variations in factor prices across   13 
firms depend on other characteristics of firms (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 
2000).  Specifically, we estimate first-stage regressions of constructed labor and capital prices on 
national-average factor prices, country and industry dummies, firm age (years since founding), 
and dummy variables indicating the structure of firm ownership.  
  wL
ijk = a0 + a1wL
k + a2wK
k + Sa 3jD
j + Sa 4kD
k + a5AGE
ijk + Sa 6mD
m    (4) 
    wK
ijk = b0 + b1wL
k + b2wK
k + Sb 3jD
j + Sb4kD
k + b5AGE
ijk + Sb 6mD
m    (5) 
Here, superscripts i, j, and k refer, respectively, to firm, industry, and country, while superscript 
m refers to type of ownership.  In the data there are four types of ownership: privately held 
domestic firms, publicly traded domestic firms (including domestic subsidiaries and joint 
ventures with domestic firms), subsidiaries of multinational firms (including joint ventures with 
multinational firms), and state-owned or collective enterprises.  In principle, age and ownership 
are past decisions that should be exogenous to current employment levels.  Thus, the 
instrumentation procedure should generate predicted wages that are exogenous to the second-
stage cost function estimation. 
With these assumptions, we can develop an estimable translog cost function.  Again, we 
treat the standard with which a firm must comply to be a quasi-fixed factor and estimate a short-
run variable cost function.  The notion is that for a firm to export it must meet the required 
compliance cost and therefore it sets aside that component of cost before allocating labor and 
capital to production activities.  We specify the translog form to permit a flexible second-order 
approximation to a cost structure depending on output, input prices, and standards.  Thus, our 
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where C
~
 denotes value-added (cost of labor and capital, referred to as production cost hereafter), 
wL denotes the instrumented wage rate, wK denotes the instrumented unit price of capital, y 
denotes sales as a measure of output, and s denotes the firm-specific measure of standards.  
Summary data on these variables are provided in Table 1 for the estimation sample.  The 
variables zn and zc denote industry-specific and country-specific factors, respectively, affecting 
firm costs.  We capture these additional factors by means of industry and country fixed effects.  
For this purpose we use the four-industry aggregation listed in Table 2 and the 16 countries in 
Table 3.   
Our setup cost for compliance is designed specifically in the survey to measure cost 
associated with foreign technical regulations and standards.  Some of the surveyed firms 
indicated that it is also necessary to comply with domestic technical regulations and standards in 
order to sell their products in the domestic market.  Because information is not available on the 
cost of complying with domestic technical regulations and standards, a dummy variable ( dom D ) 
is used to control for the possible cost difference associated with the domestic requirement.  It 
takes the value one if a firm reports that it is required to comply with domestic technical   15 
regulations and standards, and the value zero otherwise.  The variable i e  is the error term, which 
is assumed normally distributed with zero mean.   
  Equation (6) is the translog cost function, which we estimate simultaneously with the 
following equation for the share of labor in variable costs: 
i i Ls i Ly Ki LK Li LL L Li s y w w S m b b b b b + + + + + = ln ln ln ln      (7) 
The error term is also assumed normally distributed with zero mean and it reflects stochastic 
disturbances in cost minimization.  We eliminate the capital-share equation from the estimation 
because it is fully determined by equations (6) and (7) and the constraints below.   
Note that in writing these equations we have imposed the required symmetry in cross-
variable coefficients.   Further, the linear homogeneity condition imposes the following 
constraints: 
1 = + K L b b  
0 = + LK KK b b                 (8) 
0 = + LK LL b b  
0 = + Ky y L b b  
0 = + Ks Ls b b  
Equations (6) and (7) are estimated jointly in an iterative three-stage least squares 
procedure (I3SLS), subject to the constraints in equations (8).  When one of the share equations 
is dropped, the I3SLS produce is the preferred approach since the estimators are consistent and 
asymptotically efficient (Berndt and Wood 1975).  The I3SLS procedure guarantees identical 
translog cost parameters irrespective of which share equation is dropped.  The parameters for the   16 
dropped equation can be recovered by using the symmetry condition and the conditions in 
equations (8). 
From equation (6) we can determine the direct elasticity of production costs with respect 
to foreign standards as 
d
s s  = i ss s s ln b b + , which varies with the level of standards.  We are 
interested as well in the impacts of the standards on factor demands.  The coefficient  Ls b  in the 
share equation (7) measures the bias in labor use (impact on labor share) from an increase in the 
foreign standard ( Ls L Ls s S b f = ¶ ¶ ” ln ), and likewise for the bias in capital use 
Ks K Ks s S b f = ¶ ¶ ” ln ( ).  In effect, the need to meet this standard could generate an overall 
increase in costs, along with a bias in factor use toward labor or capital.   
While the direct cost elasticity is of some interest, we can calculate the total elasticity of 
cost with respect to a change in the stringency of standards, accounting for impacts on factor use, 
as 
s C S ln
~
ln ¶ ¶ ” s  =   i ys Ki Ks Li Ls i ss s y w w s ln ln ln ln b b b b b + + + + .     (9)  
This elasticity will vary with different observations on factor prices and output.  Likewise, we 
can calculate the total elasticity of scale as 
y C y ln
~
ln ¶ ¶ ” s  =  i ys Ki Ky Li Ly i yy y s w w y ln ln ln ln b b b b b + + + + .      (10) 
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4. Data and Variable Construction  
  The data used for cost estimation are taken from a new survey undertaken by the World 
Bank explicitly for the purpose of assessing compliance costs of firms in developing countries 
facing technical standards in their potential export markets.  Because the data are constructed 
from firm-level surveys we provide an overview of their development. 
4.1 The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey Data 
The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey is the first comprehensive 
questionnaire designed to elicit information from individual firms in developing countries about 
how their operations are affected by foreign technical requirements.
7  The survey was 
administered in the year 2002 to 689 firms in 17 developing countries. The objective of the 
survey is to obtain information on the relevant standards, government regulations, and technical 
barriers to trade confronting exporters from developing countries seeking to enter major 
developed-country markets.  
The countries cover a range of economic development and export experience yet have 
sufficiently deep agricultural and industrial structures to permit sectoral comparisons.  Countries 
were selected for study in five regions.  These include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria 
(East Europe); Argentina, Chile, Panama, and Honduras (Latin America); Jordan and Iran 
(Middle East); India and Pakistan (South Asia); and South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Mozambique, Kenya, and Senegal (Sub-Saharan Africa).  Information on the number of firms 
interviewed in each country and included in the estimation sample is listed in Table 3. 
                                                 
7 Wilson and Otsuki (2003) describe this survey in detail.   18 
The survey also embodies a diverse sectoral composition.  The majority of firms are 
categorized as manufacturing.  The largest single industry is textiles and apparel (46 firms) 
followed by raw agricultural products (18 firms) and processed food and tobacco (24 firms; see 
Table 2).  For analytical purposes we group the industries into four broad categories, namely raw 
food; processed food, tobacco, drug and liquor; equipment; and textiles and materials.
8   
Firms were asked to provide information about numerous characteristics, including 
product composition, age, form of ownership, employment, payroll, value of fixed assets, 
intermediate inputs, raw materials, and others.  Of particular interest is the export orientation of 
firms.  The majority of the respondent companies in the sample export at least some of their 
products.  The procedure for selecting firms meant that the sample consists of firms that are 
either currently exporting or are willing to export but have chosen not to do so for some reason. 
The number of firms that are currently exporting is 646 or 93.6 percent of the total.  The number 
of firms that are clearly not exporting is 43 or 6.4 percent of the total.  Seventy percent of the 
firms in the total sample face the need to comply with technical regulations (as defined in the 
survey) in their export markets. 
  Across all five regions, 55 percent of the firms may be categorized as the headquarters 
location of a privately held, non-listed company. About 20 percent are the headquarters location 
of a publicly traded or listed company and 18 percent are subsidiaries or joint ventures of a 
domestic enterprise. About 6.5 percent are subsidiaries of foreign firms or joint ventures with 
foreign partners.  Only a small portion of firms are state-owned or collective enterprises.   
                                                 
8 Standards in the services sector are no less important than product standards as is evident in trans-border 
operations of education, postal and telecommunication services. Collection of data on services standards, however, 
would require expansion of the definition of standards as attributes of services outputs which are different from and 
more complex than those of goods.   19 
4.2 A Measure of Standard 
A direct measure of the stringency of foreign standards and technical regulations 
confronting a variety of industries and importing partner countries is difficult to define.  
However, the relative increase in setup cost incurred for complying with these standards is a 
good proxy for their stringency.  One advantage of using reported investment to represent 
stringency is that this measure is expressed in dollar terms and therefore is comparable across 
industries and countries.  In practical terms such an aggregation is necessary because the precise 
specifications of technical standards facing firms vary across industries and cannot be 
meaningfully aggregated at that stage.  Another advantage is that expenditure for compliance can 
be interpreted as a quasi-fixed factor, permitting us to specify a short-run variable cost function.  
Our measure of foreign standards and technical regulations is constructed from 
respondents’ answers to the question summarized in Table 4.  Respondents were asked the 
following question: “What are the approximate costs of the items below as a percentage of your 
total investment costs over the last year?”  As may be seen, three categories were listed and 
respondents indicated such costs within broad ranges.
9  To focus on incremental investment as a 
measure of quasi-fixed costs, we construct a standards-cost aggregate from the first three 
categories. Weighted-average setup costs with regard to each category were computed by 
multiplying the midpoint percentage within each range by reported investment cost of each firm, 
yielding a dollar figure per category per firm.  To develop the overall measure per firm we 
simply added these various cost categories.  Thus, to quantify the perceived impact of meeting 
foreign standards and technical regulations we develop a measure of incremental contributions to 
                                                 
9 The survey also asked two questions about measures of recurrent labor costs, which we do not employ in this 
paper.   20 
setup costs arising from additional plant and equipment and product redesigns (in total and for 
multiple markets). 
Unfortunately, not all firms responded to all three categories.  Thus, to include only those 
cases with responses in all of these categories greatly would reduce the number of observations 
available for the regression analysis.  We therefore aggregated these standards variables by 
summing across the three categories, assigning a category value of zero to firms with missing 
responses, for those firms where at least one category response was positive.  Presumably, this 
procedure understates the severity of such costs and should result in conservative cost 
estimates.
10   
Therefore, we use the increase in previous year’s reported investment cost for compliance 
as a measure of the short-run fixed cost of standards and technical regulations.  As shown in 
Table 1, the total standard cost varies from a minimum of $357 to a maximum of $12.3 million.  
Reported setup costs for compliance obviously are greater for larger firms.     
 
5. Estimation Results 
The first-stage regressions to develop instrumented labor and capital prices were run 
based on equations (4) and (5).  The instruments used include per capita GDP, real interest rates, 
firm age, country and industry dummies, and dummy variables indicating the structure of firm 
ownership.  Per capita GDP and real interest rates were used to represent national average wage 
rates and national average price of capital, respectively.  We used the lending interest rate 
                                                 
10 This selection procedure raises a significant concern about selectivity bias.  To control for this we included in 
supplemental regressions a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 for firms that answered all three categories and 
a value of zero otherwise.  This made virtually no difference in the results.   21 
available from the World Development Indicators.  The interest rates were adjusted for inflation 
as measured by the GDP deflator.  These two equations were estimated jointly using seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR).  The instrumented wage rates and capital prices were then used in 
the cost function and share equation regressions.   
  In the second stage a cost function was run under alternative specifications.  The 
maximum number of observations included in these regressions was 159.  As mentioned earlier, 
this loss in observations is largely due to the low response to the questions regarding compliance 
with the foreign standards and technical regulations.  The translog cost function was estimated 
with the labor share equation jointly by using maximum likelihood estimation with iterated 
three-stage least squares.  The I3SLS method was used to obtain consistent estimators by 
guaranteeing invariance of the estimated coefficients of the share equations irrespective of which 
of the share equations is dropped (Berndt and Wood, 1975).   
The parameter estimates with respect to translog models are presented in Table 5, with 
standard errors reported in parentheses.  In the first specification we exclude the quadratic term 
on standards and the cross-terms on standards, input prices, and output.  Thus, this model tests 
for the notion that technical regulations affect costs only directly, without secondary impacts 
through scale and variable inputs.  The second equation contains the full translog specification 
and is consistent with theory.  Both of these regressions employ the instrumented factor prices 
from the first stage.  The third equation also follows the full specification but for comparison 
purposes uses the raw (uninstrumented) wage rates and unit prices of capital.  Finally, the fourth 
model is estimated under the full translog but employs a different definition of the standards 
variable, one that only contains the categories for one-time product redesign costs (excluding   22 
plant and equipment investment).  In this case the sample size falls to 96.  Our interest here is in 
seeing if the redesign costs alone have different impacts on costs.   
All equations include industry and country fixed effects.  The fit of each model is good 
with adjusted R-squared coefficients of around 0.9.  According to the procedures described in 
Berndt and Wood (1975), we examined local concavity in input prices and positivity of input 
shares for the translog model.  Our fully specified translog cost functions were found to satisfy 
these conditions. 
The results of the translog model estimation suggest that the signs for the coefficients for 
the linear and quadratic terms of the wage rate and capital price are all positive and statistically 
significant.  However, the signs and significance of the coefficients for the linear and quadratic 
terms of the log of standards are mixed.  In the restricted model I, the direct coefficient  S b  is 
positive, suggesting that costs rise with the relative severity of foreign standards.  However, in 
the general models II, III, and IV both the linear and quadratic coefficients on standards are 
negative, suggesting that the direct effect of standards is negative or cost saving.   
However, such direct impacts fail to account for the impacts of foreign technical 
regulations through factor use and scale.  We compute the total elasticity of costs with respect to 
standards as in equation (9), reporting the results in Table 6.  We evaluate this elasticity at the 
mean and first and third quartiles of standards, sales, and input prices.  It may be seen that the 
total elasticity of domestic costs in producing value added with respect to variations in foreign 
standards ranges from 0.055 to 0.325, depending on the estimation approach and sample quartile.  
This estimate is significantly positive at the mean in Model II and consistently positive and 
significant in Models III and IV.     23 
These differences require some explanation.  The highest elasticities are registered in 
Model III, in which the variable factor prices are not instrumented.  Taken literally, the result 
would suggest a quantitatively large impact of the severity of foreign standards on variable input 
costs in exporting firms.  That is, having satisfied the fixed setup costs required by foreign 
technical regulations, variable costs would increase via a large induced increase in labor and 
capital demand.  Indeed, the computed elasticities of labor and capital demand in Table 7 are 
highest in this specification, suggesting that a one-percent rise in foreign standards would induce 
an 0.3-percent increase in labor and an 0.24-percent increase in capital employment.   
However, these estimates fail to account for the endogeneity between production costs 
and factor prices in our firm-level data.  The instrumental variables approach in Models II and IV 
should offer more reliable estimates.  It may be seen that, using the fuller specification of 
standards costs in Model II, including both plant and equipment charges and redesign costs, the 
estimated cost elasticity in Table 6 is approximately 0.06, which is significantly positive only at 
the mean of the sample.  Thus, our estimate with the preferred econometric approach and the 
larger sample suggests that increases in foreign standards compliance costs modestly affect 
variable cost. 
Interestingly, however, the estimated total cost elasticity is considerably higher in Model 
IV, which incorporates only the product-redesign costs as a fixed factor.  In that specification the 
estimated elasticity is around 0.13 and is highly significant at the sample mean.  This finding 
indicates that the need to reorient product characteristics to meet foreign standards adds 
significantly to short-run variable costs.  While the results in Models II and IV are not strictly 
comparable because of the different samples, this provides some indication that it is the need to   24 
meet foreign requirements on product characteristics that matters rather more for sustaining 
export positions.  As may be seen in Table 7, the need for redesign implies induced increases in 
demand for labor and capital of perhaps 0.12 - 0.15 percent.   
While the estimated elasticities of variable cost with respect to the severity of foreign 
standards seem modest, the implied cost impacts should be kept in perspective.  As noted in 
Table 8, at the sample mean a one-percent increase in compliance costs amounts to $4,250 for 
the larger sample ($1,620 for the smaller sample).  In turn, the table lists the dollar increment in 
variable costs implied by the elasticities in each model at the sample mean.  As may be seen, this 
increase is $5,270 in Model II and $12,904 in Model IV.  Thus, the implied expansion of 
variable costs is, in fact, of a similar magnitude to the rise in required investment to meet 
compliance costs.  Viewed this way the impact on overall costs for the average firm, including 
both compliance expenditures and variable charges, is economically significant. 
Estimates of the scale elasticity (equation (10) are also presented in Table 6.  This 
parameter measures the percentage change in variable cost with respect to a one-percentage 
change in output and may be interpreted as the ratio of marginal cost to average cost.  These 
scale elasticities range between 0.91 and 1.11.  It is therefore not clear whether the average firm 
in our sample exhibits economies of scale or diseconomies of scale.  
We have assumed so far that the elasticity of costs with respect to standards is constant 
across industries.  Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient numbers of observations to run a 
separate cost function regression per industry even using the aggregated industries.  We instead 
examine the constancy of the elasticity by letting the elasticity vary across industries in a pooled 
regression.  That is, we estimate equations (6) and (7), incorporating interaction terms between   25 
the standards variables and four aggregate industry dummies.  Let  j denote j
th  industry. 
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This revision of the equations and a constraint permits us to compute elasticities for four 
aggregated industries, including equipment, textiles and materials, raw food, and processed food. 
The j
th  industry’s total elasticity of cost with respect to standards is: 
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The results for each model are presented in Table 9.  There appear to be no significant 
impacts on variable costs in processed foods, drugs, and liquors.  Estimated cost elasticities are   26 
consistently positive in the other sectors and standards seem to affect variable costs especially in 
equipment (Model II) and textiles and material (Model IV). 
Finally, Table 9 displays the elasticities of labor and capital demand with respect to 
standards.  These may be defined as 
s S s C s L L Ls ln / ln ln / ln ln / ln ¶ ¶ - ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ ” s                 (16) 
s S s C s K K Ks ln / ln ln / ln ln / ln ¶ ¶ - ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ ” s  
Using the elasticity of cost with respect to standards, evaluated at the mean, the full translog 
model with instrumented input prices (Model II) implies that  Ls s =0.060 and  Ks s =0.056.  This 
indicates that a rise in compliance setup costs increases both labor and capital usage, with a 
slightly greater increase in labor demand.  As noted above, these effects are larger in Model IV.  
The Allen partial elasticities of substitution in Table 10 indicate a moderate substitutability 
between labor and capital ( KL s ) in the sample.  The own-elasticity estimates indicate that labor 
is highly elastic with respect to its own price and that capital is much less elastic.  
   
6. Conclusions 
This paper estimates the impact on short-run costs of complying with standards and 
technical regulations required by importing countries using firm-level data on technical barriers 
to trade for 16 developing countries based on the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade 
Survey Database.  The translog model results indicate that incremental production costs are 
greater for a firm confronting more stringent standards and technical regulations.  Using the 
broader measure of standards in Model II, variable production costs are 0.058 percent higher   27 
when the initial setup cost for compliance with foreign standards is increased by 1 percent.  In 
this case 0.060 percent additional labor and 0.056 percent additional capital are employed.  
Using the narrower cost definition, focusing on product redesign costs, the impacts on variable 
costs are considerably higher, at 0.13 - 0.14 percent, with correspondingly higher impacts on 
variable factors.  We focus on only labor and capital cost, but other types of input costs may arise 
as additional plants and production units will require additional raw material, energy and 
intermediate inputs.    
Our analysis demonstrates the possible supply response in developing country enterprises 
when changes in foreign standards and technical regulations take place.  It can also be inferred 
how much more (less) cost is incurred when a firm switches between export markets that vary in 
the severity of standards and technical regulations.  It is conceivable that firms might avoid 
higher-cost markets in light of the impacts on production expenditures.  
The results may be cautiously interpreted as indications of the extent to which standards 
and technical regulations constitute non-tariff barriers to trade.  While the relative impact on 
costs is small in terms of the underlying elasticity, it could be decisive for particular firms and 
countries.  In this context, there is scope for assessing the damages to the exporting country’s 
trade benefits where the importing country’s regulations may not conform to WTO obligations.  
Policy solutions then might be sought by identifying the extent to which subsidies or public 
support programs are needed to offset the cost disadvantage that stems from international 
technical regulations.  Furthermore, disaggregation of the cost disadvantage into those associated 
with initial setup and variable production costs would help identify policy solutions regarding 
standards and technical regulations. The existence of both setup and variable costs would imply   28 
that a discrete action, such as upgrading infrastructure and training through government 
programs and assistance from international organizations, for example, would be necessary to 
overcome the cost disadvantage in addition to ad valorem subsidies.   29 
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 Table 1. Data Summary 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Value Added  (US$1,000)         9,087        22,744            13        189,463 
Sales (US$1,000)        21,382        49,297            48        336,216 
Wage rate (US$1,000)           3.14           3.14         0.11           15.38 
Wage rate instrumented (US$1,000)*           2.47           1.78         0.34             8.15 
Unit price of capital (US$1,000)           1.92           4.10         0.00           29.91 
Unit price of capital instrumented (US$1,000)*           0.82           0.63         0.06             4.01 
Per capita GDP (US$1,000)         2.22        1.89         0.26           7.47
Real interest rate (lending) (%)           9.00          4.78 1.68            29.09
Number of years since foundation         27.58         23.71         2         142
Standards (compliance costs of previous year) (US$1,000)            425        1,441 0.357        12,310
*Please see Section 5 for the instruments used for the wage rate and the unit price of capital. 
 
 
 Table 2. Industries in the Sample 
 
Aggregate Industry   Sub-industry  Count 
Raw food  Raw agricultural and meat products  18 
 Subtotal                 18 
Processed food, tobacco, 
drug and liquor 
Processed food, tobacco, drug and liquor 
24 
 Subtotal                 24 
Equipment  Electronics  11 
  Industrial equipment  4 
  Transportation equipment, and auto parts  10 
  Other equipment  6 
 Subtotal              31 
Textiles and Materials  Metal and mineral  15 
   Chemical  11 
   Leather  3 
  Plastics material  9 
   Textiles and apparel  46 
   Wood product  2 
 Subtotal               86 
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Table 3. Number of Surveys Used for the Analysis by Country 
 
Region  Country  Count 
East Europe  Bulgaria  23 
   Czech Republic  6 
   Poland  9 
East Europe Total     38 
Latin America & Caribbean  Argentina  5 
   Chile  7 
   Honduras  3 
   Panama  6 
Latin.America & Caribbean Total  21 
Middle East  Iran  14 
   Jordan  6 
Middle East Total     20 
South Asia  India  33 
   Pakistan  30 
South Asia Total     41 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Kenya  8 
   Nigeria  1 
   Senegal  2 
   South Africa  25 
   Uganda  5 
Sub-Saharn Africa Total     39 
        




Table 4. Question on Cost Impact of Complying with Foreign Standards as a Share in Total 
Investment (number of firms) 








>100%  Total 
Additional plant or 
equipment 
62  32  14  6  3  3  120 
One-time product redesign  70  17  5  3  1  0  96 
Product redesign for each 
market 
57  15  4  4  0  0  80 





Model  II 
(I3SLS) 




0 b   -0.810  -1.585**  0.031  -1.751 
  (0.660)  (0.804)  0.977  (1.146) 
y b   0.761***  1.068***  1.153***  1.181*** 
  (0.145)  (0.219)  0.309  (0.296) 
yy b   0.019  -0.040  -0.116**  -0.067 
  (0.018)  (0.034)  0.016  (0.041) 
L b   0.351***  0.376***  0.286***  0.416*** 
  (0.083)  (0.087)  0.067  (0.104) 
K b   0.649***  0.624***  0.714***  0.584*** 
  (0.083)  (0.087)  0.067  (0.104) 
LL b   0.079***  0.077***  0.078***  0.065*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  0.005  (0.012) 
KK b   0.079***  0.077***  0.078***  0.065*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  0.005  (0.012) 
LK b   -0.079***  -0.077***  -0.078***  -0.065*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  0.005  (0.012) 
Ly b   -0.011  -0.016  0.006  -0.016 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  0.51  (0.014) 
Ky b   0.011  0.016  -0.006  0.016 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  0.51  (0.014) 
s b   0.055*  -0.254*  -0.528**  -0.391 
  (0.031)  (0.153)  0.015  (0.257) 
ss b     -0.050**  -0.084**  -0.079** 
    (0.025)  0.018  (0.037) 
Ls b     -0.002  -0.024***  -0.016 
    (0.010)  0.004  (0.014) 
Ks b     0.002  0.024***  0.016 
    (0.010)  0.004  (0.014) 
ys b     0.058**  0.133***  0.090** 
    (0.026)  0.037  (0.036) 
D b   0.008  0.013  -0.355***  0.002 
  (0.113)  (0.111)  0.025  (0.172) 
Fixed Effects  Industry, Country  Industry, Country  Industry, Country  Industry, Country 
wL and wk Instrumented   yes  yes  no  yes 
Standards  Redesign and Equipment  Redesign and Equipment  Redesign and Equipment  One-time Redesign 
Statistics         
N  159  159  159  96 
Adjusted R-squared  0.923  0.923  0.873  0.924 
Log likelihood  -95.435  -92.754  -108.765  -47.915 
Note: The adjusted R-squared is computed as one minus the ratio of the residual sum of squares to the total sum of 
squares, adjusted by the degrees of freedom.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors and coefficients are 
significantly different from zero as indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and *(10%).  34 
Table 6: Elasticity of Variable Cost with respect to Standards and Scale 
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote asymptotic t-values.  
 
Table 7: Effect of Standards and Technical Regulations on Input Demand 
 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Labor Demand 
( Ls s )  na  0.060 0.299 0.148
Capital  Demand 





Table 8. Estimated Impact on Mean Dollar Variable Costs of One-Percent Increase in 
Mean Setup Costs 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
One-percent Increase in 
Mean Setup Costs 
$4,250  $4,250  $4,250  $1,620 
Mean Impact  $4,998  $5,270  $24,535  $12,904 
 
 Elasticity with 
respect to 
Elasticity 
evaluated at  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
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Table 9: Elasticity of Variable Cost with respect to Standards by Industry 
 
Model  Model I Model II Model III Model IV
































Note: Numbers in parentheses denote asymptotic t-values. 
 
 
Table 10: Substitution Elasticity Estimates 
 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Allen Elasticity of 
substitution between L and 
K ( KL s ) 
0.639 0.636 0.627 0.694
Own elasticity of L ( LL s )  -1.456 -1.450 -1.404 -1.600
Own elasticity of K ( KK s )  -0.280 -0.279 -0.280 -0.301
 
 
 